Law and politics and the relationship between the two have always been at the center of philosophical and political perspectives, because the acceptance of any theory leaves extensive effects on social structures. One of the most important areas affected by these perspectives is the legal system, especially criminal law. The principle of the minimum of criminal law, with its own foundations, offers a distinctive approach to delimiting the scope of criminal intervention.



One of the most fundamental issues in the philosophy of law is determining the extent and limits of state intervention in individual rights and freedoms. Despite its widespread use in legal literature, this concept has often remained without a precise definition. Determining the scope of criminal law as the most severe means of intervention is accompanied by theoretical and practical challenges; therefore, resorting to criminal means should be based on necessity, caution, and thrift, and not simply on proportionality.



Although the principle of the minimum of criminal law has been institutionalized in modern law since the 18th century, this principle also has a long history in Islamic jurisprudence and law and can be identified in Sunni and Shiite sources. Examining criminal intervention from the perspective of moral and political philosophy, concepts such as the legitimacy of the use of force and the right of the state to intervene fall under the category of "justification." Moral, social, and institutional justifications each explain different aspects of this intervention.



This article seeks to answer the questions raised and provide suggestions for limiting criminal intervention and strengthening the humane approach in the criminal justice system by explaining the concepts, foundations, and effects of the principle of minimality in criminal policymaking and considering the historical course of interventions.