The question of analogy is one of the central points of disagreement between the schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In this article, two significant and historical approaches to this issue in the works of Sheikh Tusi and Ibn Fara are examined and analyzed. Ibn Fara, from the Hanbali tradition, based on reason, custom, the conduct of the companions, and textual analysis, defends the permissibility of worshipping by analogy. In contrast, Sheikh Tusi, based on epistemological and textual foundations, considers analogy to lack jurisprudential authority. The article, while categorizing the arguments of both thinkers, shows that the conflict between the two lies more in the definition of analogy and the limits of the authority of suspicion than in the principle of ijtihad. By reinterpreting the concept of analogy in Ibn Fara’s view as a rational ijtihad based on the discovery of patterns, and analyzing Tusi’s criticism as a negation of hypothetical analogy, the possibility of a scientific convergence between the two views has been suggested. If we consider Ibn Fara’s analogy not as hypothetical analogy, but as rational ijtihad based on the discovery of patterns, it is compatible with Sheikh Tusi’s principles. The final conclusion of the article is that by redefining key concepts, it is possible to move the fundamental dialogue between jurisprudential traditions from opposition to interaction.